In this article, the Executive Secretary of ECLA gives an overview of the evolution of the region's economy during the past year, looking at production, employment, inflation, and especially the external sector.
In his 'Final Conclusions', the author notes that the profound crisis through which the countries of Latin America are passing has forced them to apply adjustment policies aimed at bringing the external sector back into balance. The economic and social consequences of these policies have been exaggerated, however, by the fact that they have had to be carried out at a time of worldwide recession, they have been accompanied by a massive contraction in the net inflow of capital, and they are based on instruments which reduce demand and fail to take advantage of national production capacity.
In order to reverse these trends, the countries should orient their policies towards an 'expansive adjustment' based on a solid process of reactivation. Among the main factors conditioning the achievement of this objective, the author mentions the refinancing of the external debt, the evolution of external trade (both within the region and with the rest of the world), the reduction of inflationary pressures, and the restructuring of growth patterns to strengthen production and export capacity (in this respect, see the Quito Declaration and Plan of Action reproduced elsewhere in this issue of C;EPAI. Review).
The author stresses that in tackling these conditions it is necessary to review both old ideas and some newer ones. With regard to the latter, he reminds readers of the serious consequences brought about by strategies based on extensive financial and trade links with the exterior when the international parameters underwent a sudden and prolonged change.
I Introduction
The economic evolution of Latin America in 1983 was characterized by two main features. The first was the aggravation of the crisis which began in 1981 and which by 1982 had become the most serious one experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The second was the remarkable effort made by most of the countries of the region to reduce the serious imbalances that had been building up in the external sector over the last few years.
In 1983, as in 1982, the crisis affected almost every country of the region and was evidenced in the deterioration of the main economic indicators. Thus, according to the preliminary estimates available to ECLA, which are shown in table 1, the gross domestic product of Latin America as a whole dropped by 3.3%, after having already decreased by 1% in 1982; as a result of this drop and of population growth, the per capita product fell by 5.6% in the region as a whole and declined in 17 of the 19 countries for which comparable information is available.
Inconsequence of this downward movement and of the fact that it had also fallen during the two preceding years, the per capita product of Latin America was almost 10% lower in 1983 than in 1980 and was back at the level the region had reached in 1977. National per capita income dropped even more sharply (-5.9%), as 1983 brought a further deterioration, for the third year in a row, of the terms of trade for the region as a whole, and, for the sixth year in a row, of the terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries. The terms of trade for the latter showed a total decline of 38% by comparison with 1977 and, for the second year in a row, sank even below the level reached during the worst times of the Great Depression.
The slowdown of economic activity was accompanied by a new rise in urban unemployment rates in almost every country for which relatively reliable data are available. In spite of this, inflation accelerated spectacularly, as it had over the last three years, reaching record highs. The simple average rate of increase of consumer prices climbed from 47% in 1982 to 68% in 1983 and the rate weighted by population soared even more sharply, from 86% in 1982 to 130% in 1983. In its turn, the extraordinary effort made by the region to adjust tp these problems was reflected in radical changes in the external sector. Thus, in 1983 Latin America achieved an unprecedented merchandise trade surplus. Merchandise trade, which up to 1981 had regularly shown a negative balance, but which by 1982 had recorded a surplus of over US$ 9.7 billion, generated a surplus of almost US$ 31.2 billion in 1983 (see figure 1 ). This surplus was exclusively due, however, to a new and spectacular drop in the value of imports of goods, which went down by Includes long-and short-term capital, unrequited official transfer payments, and errors and omissions. ' Variation in international reserves (with inverted sign) plus counterpart entries. « 1975 to 1980: includes officially guaranteed public and private external debt, plus non-guaranteed long-and short-term debt with financial institutions reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. Does not include guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt with other commercial banks nor non-guaranteed supplier loans. 1981 to 1983: includes official estimates of the total external debt, which means that the figures have a wider coverage and are not strictly comparable with those of the previous period. close to 29% after having fallen by 20% in 1982. So unheard-of a reduction in foreign purchases was both an effect and a cause of the shrinkage of domestic economic activity, and reflected the exceptionally strict adjustment policies applied in many countries. The value of exports of goods, on the other hand, decreased slightly, even though the volume of exports rose by 7% in the region as a whole and by 9% in the non-oil-exporting countries.
Net remittances for profits and interest also went down, so that the exceptionally high rate of growth of previous years was halted. These payments, which between 1977 and 1982 had shot up more than fourfold, from US$ 8.6 billion to US$ 36.8 billion, diminished to somewhat under US$ 34 billion in 1983. Nevertheless, since the value of exports fell at the same time, payments of interest and profits were still equivalent to almost 39% of external sales of goods. As a result of the changes in merchandise trade and in remittances of profits and interest, and of the considerable decrease in net payments for services, the deficit on current account plummeted from US$ 36.4 billion in 1982 to under US$ 8.5 billion in 1983, thus reaching the lowest level since 1974. This exceptional reduction of the deficit on current account was accompanied and to
Production and employment
The slowdown of the Latin American economy, which had already been evident in the two preceding years, was even more pronounced in 1983. After having risen by only 1.5% in 1981 -the lowest growth rate since 1940-and fallen by 1% in 1982, the region's gross domestic product dropped by 3.3% in 1983 (see table 2).
As a result of this unprecedented reduction of economic activity and of population growth, the per capita product fell for the third year in some extent caused by a no less drastic shrinkage of the net inflow of capital. This item, which in 1982 had already been halved, after having reached a record high of US$ 38 billion in 1981, again dropped sharply in 1983, amounting to not even as much as US$ 4.5 billion.
Because of this pronounced contraction in the net movement of loans and investments, and despite the substantial reduction of the negative balance on current account, the balance of payments closed with a deficit of almost US$ 4 billion; although this was much lower than the US$ 19.8 billion recorded in 1982, it represented a new and dangerous drain on Latin America's international reserves. As had already been the case in 1982, the abrupt decline of the net inflow of capital meant that much less capital came in than was paid out for interest and profits. Consequently, Latin America, which up to 1981 had received a net transfer of real resources from abroad, in 1983 made a net transfer of resources to the rest of the world of almost US$ 30 billion.
Also in consequence of the decrease in the net inflow of capital, the growth rate of external debt slackened for the second year in succession, falling to 7%, which was a good deal lower than the 12% growth rate of 1982 and far below the 23% rate recorded, on average, between 1977 and 1981. succession, at a much higher rate (-5.6%) than in 1981 (-l%)andl982(-3.3%). Consequently, the per capita product was almost 10% lower in 1983 than in 1980. The exceptional intensity of the decline in economic activity over the last three years was also reflected in decreases in the per capita product of a number of Latin American countries. During this period, the per capita product diminished by over 20% in El Salvador, Bolivia and Costa Rica; by over 15% in Uruguay and Peru; by over 14% in Chile; by around 14% in II Main trends Table 2 LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1970 -1974 TO 1981 -1983 (see table 3 ). Furthermore, as in 1982, the downturn in economic activity was widespread. Indeed, the gross domestic product dropped in 14 of the 19 countries for which comparable information is available, remained virtually at a standstill in two of them, and rose slightly in the other three. In ' The concept of global social product used in Cuban statistics is equivalent to the sum of gross production in the agricultural, industrial, mining, energy, transport, communications and trade sectors. addition, in Cuba the global social product increased by around 4%' {see table 2).
Nevertheless, in constrast to what happened in 1982, the decline in the product of the region as a whole in 1983 was due in particular to the highly unfavourable trend in productive activity in Brazil and Mexico, which are by far the two largest economies in Latin America.
In Brazil -which alone generates around one-third of the total domestic product of the region-overall economic activity contracted by around 5%, after having expanded marginally in 1982. This slump, which is without precedent in the last fifty years of Brazil's economic growth, was due, in particular, to the new and sharp reduction in the volume of imports and the severe cuts made in public sector investment programmes, as well as to the growing uncertainty caused by the acceleration of the inflationary spiral and the prolonged and laborious efforts of the economic authorities to renegotiate the external debt and to enter into a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The gross domestic product also fell markedly (-4%) in Mexico, where economic activity had declined slightly in 1981, after having grown substantially over the previous four years. This contraction was mainly caused by the drastic reduction of domestic demand and of the volume of imports resulting from the restrictive policy applied by the government in order to strengthen the balance of payments and control the galloping inflation that had been unleashed during the preceding year. Although the implementation of this policy did succeed in halving the substantial public sector deficit of 1982 and helped.to generate an impressive trade surplus, it also brought about considerable reductions in fiscal expenditure, private investment and wages, and a substantial increase in unemployment, with the resulting negative effects on domestic expenditure and the level of activity.
The product declined even more steeply in Bolivia (-6%) and, particularly, in Peru (-12%); in 1983, these two countries suffered from a singular combination of natural disasters, characterized mainly by torrential rains and flooding in some regions and prolonged and serious drought in others. In addition to these disasters, which had done great damage to agricultural production, Peru was alsq affected by a change in the ocean currents which caused a sheer drop in the output of the fishing sector. In both countries, economic activity also suffered the impact of galloping inflation, and in Peru the volume of imports plummeted.
The situation was similar, athough less serious, in Ecuador, whose domestic product fell by 3.5% because fishing, agriculture and industry in the coastal belt suffered the destructive effects of unusually heavy rains, flooding and tidal waves; inflation reached an unprecedented level (66%), and the quantum of imports brusquely contracted (-25%).
Production and employment trends continued to be very unfavourable in Uruguay. After having remained at a standstill in 1981 and fallen by almost 9% in 1982, the gross domestic product dropped by 5.5% in 1983. As in the previous year, this new decline was caused, in particular, by the substantial decreases in industrial production, construction and commercial services and the very severe contraction yet again shown by the volume of imports, which shrank by 39%, after having dwindled by 30% in 1982 and 14% in 1981 . Also as in 1982, the decline of economic activity went hand in hand with a considerable increase in unemployment. As shown in table 4 and figure 2, the unemployment rate in Montevideo, which almost doubled between 1981 and 1982, continued to rise in 1983, exceeding 16% towards the middle of the year.
During 1983, the level of economic activity also fell in Venezuela, whose gross domestic product is estimated to have dropped by around 2%. Since it had remained virtually at a standstill since 1978, the per capita product decreased for the fifth year in succession. As in other countries, two major causes of the decline in economic activity were the sharp contraction in imports -the volume of which was reduced by 60%-and the increased uncertainty generated by the devaluation of the bolivar and the drastic modifications introduced in the exchange system, which came after a long period of a fixed exchange rate and virtually no restrictions on foreign currency transactions.
In most of the Central American economies, too, the domestic product decreased. Nevertheless, the decline in economic activity was relatively slight and fell far short of the temendous slumps previously recorded in some of these countries. This change was especially marked in Costa Rica -where the product fell by 0.5% in 1983, after having dropped by around 5% in 1981 and by 9% in 1982-and in Nicaragua, which managed to increase its product by 2%, thus offsetting the downturn it had experienced in 1982. On the other hand, the economy expanded much more slowly (0.5%) in Panama, whose rate of growth in 1982 (5.5%) had been the highest in Latin America.
In Chile, the sharp decline of economic activity, which had begun in mid-1981 and which in 1982 had caused the gross domestic product to drop by over 14% and unemployment to risejust as sharply, was attenuated in 1983 (see table 2 and figure 2). Although economic activity continued to fall during the first half of 1983, it tended to recover slowly after that, as a result of increased public expenditure, lower real interest rates, and the greater protection for activities competing with imports that was provided by the maintenance of a higher real exchange rate, the raising of the general tariff from 10% to 20% and the imposition of higher special tariffs on imports of certain agricultural and industrial goods. Nevertheless, this recovery did not compensate for the lag in economic activity during the first half of the year, and consequently, the gross domestic product dropped by around 0.5% over the year as a whole. In addition, although overt unemployment in Greater Santiago decreased almost constantly, from 25.2% during August-October 1982 to 17.7% a year later, this was mainly due to the expansion, during that period, of the emergency employment programmes carried out by the government, the productivity of which is generally low and in which wages are very low as well.
The recovery of economic activity was much more marked in Argentina, where the product rose by 2%, thanks, in particular, to the fact that Metropolitan Lima. 1978 average July to August; 1979 August to September; 1980 April; 1981 June; 1982 and 1983 official estimates. k Montevideo. Average for two semesters; 1983 average for January to August. industrial production increased by around 9%. Nevertheless, inasmuch as overall economic activiy had dropped by 11 % over the previous two years, while manufacturing production had fallen by almost 23% between 1979 and 1982, neither came close, in 1983, to recovering the levels reached in 1977.
The gross domestic product of Colombia was only slightly higher (0.5%) in 1983 and the country's growth rate declined for the fifth year in succession. The main cause of the slowdown of the economy was the falling-off in industrial production, which was affected by the sluggish growth ofdomestic demand and the reduction of exports to Venezuela and Ecuador, where Colombian manufactures ceased to be competitive after the devaluation of the bolivar and the sucre. As a result of the decline of industrial production and despite the moderate growth of construction, unemployment rose for the second year in a row in the country's most important cities, reaching an average of 11%, the highest figure for the last nine years (see table 4 and figure 2).
Finally, in 1983, economic activity expanded by 4% in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the only two countries of the region, besides Colombia and Panama, that were able to raise their overall levels of production steadily over the last three years.
Inflation
Despite the decline of economic activity and the growth of unemployment, and notwithstanding the weakening of inflationary pressures from abroad, the rate of increase of prices continued to speed up in most of the Latin American economies, reaching a new record for the region as a whole in 1983. Indeed, the simple average rate of increase of consumer prices jumped from 47% in 1982 to 68% in 1983, and the rate weighted by the population rose even more sharply, from somewhat under 86% in 1982 to 130% in 1983.
The rate of inflation accelerated with particular virulence in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay, and continued to be very high in Mexico and, especially, in Bolivia. On the other hand, it dropped dramatically in Costa Rica, fell moderately but steadily in Colombia and was very low in Barbados, the Dominican Republic and Panama (see table 5 and figure 3).
Consumer prices continued to soar in 1983 in Argentina, so that by the end of November their annual rate of increase was 400%, almost double the figure for the previous year and much higher than the rates recorded in 1975 and 1976. As in previous years, this phenomenon was related to the existence of a considerable fiscal deficit and the spreading of increasingly negative expectations as to future price trends. Thus for the eighth time in the last nine years, inflation in Argentina reached a three-digit level.
Inflation also crescendoed in Brazil. As a result of the swollen public sector deficit, the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro in February, the continual subsequent increases in the exchange rate, the deterioration of expectations and the complex and generalized indexing system that was in force, consumer prices, which had risen at a rate of around 95% between 1980 and 1982, shot up by 175% during the twelve months ending in November 1983, while the general price index more than tripled in the same period.
The acceleration of inflation was also exceptionally serious in Peru, while the annual rate of increase of consumer prices, after having fluctuated around 70% in 1981 and 1982, rose to almost 125% in October 1983. This notable upswing was the result, in particular, of the much more rapid devaluation policy followed by the economic authorities up to August, as well as of the steep increase in food prices due to the effects of drought and floods.
Although it was much lower in absolute terms than in Peru, Brazil and Argentina, in relative terms inflation rose more sharply in Ecuador. As shown in figure 4, between October 1982 and October 1983 the annual rate of increase of consumer prices more than tripled, rising from 20% to 66%. As in other countries, this acceleration of the inflationary process was largely attributable to the devaluations of the sucre that were enacted as from 1982, after a long period of stability in the exchange rate. In this case, however, a decisive part was also played by the decrease in the supply of agricultural products caused by floods.
Inflation also rose constantly and steeply in 1983 in Uruguay, where the rate of increase of prices, after having shown a steady downward trend between early 1980 and November 1982, turned sharply upward again after the devaluation of the peso at the end of November 1982. Thus, the annual rate of inflation shot up to 63% in November 1983, almost six times the rate that had been reached immediately before the increase in the exchange rate.
2
Inflation followed a different trend in Bolivia, where, up to October 1983, prices had risen at an annual rate (249%) that was lower than the rate recorded at the end of 1982 (296%). Nevertheless, the rate of inflation in Bolivia continued to be the second highest in the region. Moreover, as minimum wages were raised by over 70% in November and the exchange rate was increased 2 As inflation is expected to be considerably lower in December 1983 than ¡n.December 1982 (when prices rose by around 9% after the devaluation of the peso), the annual rate of increase of consumer prices will probably go down to around 55% at the end of 1983. 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information.
by 150% during the same month, after having remained steady for a year, inflation can be expected, over the coming months, to exceed its already high level.
In 1983, inflation also remained very high in Mexico, although it slowed down after the middle of the year. The annual rate of increase of consumer prices reached a record high of almost 120% in July, but subsequently dropped almost steadily, so that it was 92% in November.
3 This reversal of the inflationary trend was mainly due to the considerable reduction of the fiscal deficit and the very restrictive wage policy applied by the economic authorities.
The reversal of the inflationary trend was much more definite and spectacular in Costa Rica, where, as in Mexico, the rate of increase of prices had risen with exceptional force in 1982. After having reached an unprecedented level of around 110% in September 1982, the rate of increase of consumer prices fell dramatically and persistently over the following months and in October 1983 dropped below 13% (see figure 4).
The course followed by inflation in Chile was more complex in 1983. Indeed, between June 1982 -when the peso was devalued after almost three years of stability-and June 1983, the annual rate of increase of consumer prices climbed steadily from 4% to somewhat over 32%. Nevertheless, as the effect on the cost of tradable goods produced by the sharp rises in the exchange rate which occurred during the second half of 1982 began to wane, and as real wages continued to fall, the rate of inflation began to slow down gradually after August 1983 and sank to under 24% in November.
During 1983, inflation continued to decline gradually but constantly in Colombia, the Latin American country that has had the most stable rate of increase in prices over the last ten years. This reduction in the intensity of the inflationary process occurred despite the fact that the authorities had stepped up the rate of increase of the minidevaluations of the peso in order to strengthen the balance of payments. The increased inflationary pressure that this might have brought to bear was neutralized, however, by the slow growth of domestic demand.
Among the countries that have traditionally had moderate rates of inflation and in which the variations in the domestic level of prices have usually tended to follow those of international inflation, the rate of increase of consumer prices rose slightly in El Salvador and at a higher rate in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and, especially, Paraguay. The rate continued to decline, on the other hand, in Barbados, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
The external sector
In 1983, Latin America made a tremendous effort to reduce the disequilibria that had been accumulating in the external sector since the late 1970s. Thus, to the higher exchange rates adopted by numerous countries of the region in 1982 were added, in 1983, new devaluations, various other measures aimed at controlling imports and encouraging exports, and strict fiscal, monetary and wage policies directed towards reducing domestic expenditure.
As a result of these adjustment policies, and despite the unfavourable trends in world trade and external financing, in 1983 the region achieved a huge surplus in its merchandise trade, and notably reduced not only its current-account deficit but also the deficit on the balance of payments (see tables 6 and 7).
a) External trade and the terms of trade
However, the 1983 surplus of over US$ 31 billion was only achieved through a drastic reduction of imports, which dropped by almost 29%, after having fallen by 20% in 1982. Since the unit value of imports did not vary in 1983 and since it had decreased slightly in 1982, the contractions in the volume of imports were just as pronounced as those in their total value (see table 8 ).
The large-scale reduction in both the value and the volume of external purchases was, moreover, a widespread phenomenon. In 1983, the volume of imports fell by over 10% in every country of the region except Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. But even in these countries, where the volume of imports rose, the increase did not offset the substantial reductions that had taken place in 1982.
In countries such a Venezuela, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile, the contraction of the volume of imports was so spectacular as to reveal clearly the enormous magnitude of the adjustment effort that had been made. Thus, the quantum of imports fell by 60% in Venezuela; declined by 39% in Uruguay and by 36% in Mexico, after having already dropped by 30% and 41%, respectively, in 1982; decreased by Ecuador (1982 ), El Salvador (1982 , Guyana (1982) , Nicaragua (1981 Nicaragua ( , 1982 27% in Peru and declined by 17% in both Argentina and Chile, in both of which imports had already fallen by around 40% in 1982.
In contrast, the volume of exports rose by 7% in the region as a whole and by 9% in the non-oil-exporting countries. As was the case with respect to the real decline of imports, the increases in the volume of exports mainly reflected the adjustment effort made by the Latin American economies through measures aimed at modifying relative prices for tradable and nontradable goods and reducing domestic expenditure.
Nevertheless, the unfavourable evolution of world trade, for a fourth year in succession, and the drop in the international prices of oil and other commodities prevented this increase in the volume of exports from bringing about a similar increase in their value. Indeed, the value of exports fell slightly in the region as a whole and by almost 6% in the group of oil-exporting countries (see table 9). Ecuador (1982 ), El Salvador (1982 , Guyana (1982) , Nicaragua (1981 Nicaragua ( , 1982 and Trinidad and Tobago (1982) are provisional estimates prepared by EC:LA and are subject to revision. Figures for Chile (1981, 1982 and 1983) : Central Bank. 1983: ECLA, provisional estimates subject to revision. " Excluding net payments for profits and interest. * Including net unrequited private transfer payments. Although the fall in the international price of hydrocarbons had a lot to do with the drop in the unit value of exports in 1983, this was also due to the decline of the international prices of some of the region's major export commodities, such as coffee and sugar, and several minerals. Moreover, the substantial increases in the international prices of bananas, cocoa, maize, fish meal, wool and copper did not in any way, except in the case of bananas, offset the tremendous reductions in the prices of these commodities in previous years (see table 10).
Since the unit value of exports fell much more than that of imports, Latin America's terms of trade declined by slightly over 7%, after having fallen by 5% in 1982 and by 7% in 1981 (see table 11 ). As in 1982, the decrease in the terms of trade was more pronounced in the oil-exporting countries than in the other economies of the region. Nevertheless, since the terms of trade of the latter had already deteriorated sharply over the last five years, not only was the relevant index around 30% lower in 1983 than in 1978, but it reached the lowest level of the last half-century. Indeed, during the period 1980-1983, it was much lower, on average, than it had been during 1931-1933, the most critical period of the Great Depression. Among the oil-exporting countries, on the other hand, the deterioration in the terms of trade during the last two years did not offset the remarkable advance that had been made during the biennium 1979-1980. Thus, in all these economies except Peru, the termsof-trade index was still much higher in 1983 than in any of the non-oil-exporting countries; in all the oilexporting countries taken together, the terms of trade were 16% higher than in 1978, the year preceding the second series of sharp rises in the international price of hydrocarbons.
The new decline in the terms of trade meant that in 1983, the purchasing power of Latin American exports came to a complete standstill, even though the volume of exports had increased by around 7%. Their volume grew even more (9%) in the non-oil-exporting countries, thus marking the resumption of the vigorous growth which had taken place since the beginning of the 1970s and which had been interrupted in 1982 (see figure 5 ). Also as a result of this increase in the volume of exports, the purchasing power of the exports of this group of countries rose by 6.5% in 1983. However, this did not come near to compensating for the decline of previous years. The volume of exports grew much less (2.5%) in the oil-exporting countries and did not offset the impact of the deterioration of their terms of trade which fell by around 7.5%. Consequently, the purchasing power of their exports fell, for the second year in a row, by approximately 4% (see table 12 ).
b) had been replaced by a surplus of over US$ 9.7 billion, 1983 brought an extraordinary increase in the trade surplus, which amounted to over US$ 31 billion, more than three times that of the previous year. This was, in particular, the result of the enormous increases in the trade surpluses of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, and of the evolution of merchandise trade in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay. In Venezuela, the trade surplus of over US$ 9.3 billion almost tripled that of 1982, despite the fact that, as in 1982, the value of exports fell significantly.
In Brazil, on the other hand -where the merchandise trade surplus increased eightfold bertween 1982 and 1983, from US$ 780 million to US$ 6.3 billion-the improvement was due both to an increase in exports and to a decrease in imports. Mexico, which in 1982 had already managed to convert its US$ 4.1 billion deficit of 1981 into a surplus of almost US$6.9 billion, Peru of a small surplus for its deficit of the previous year.
By contrast with what happened in 1982, when the impact of the change in the trade balance on current account was neutralized, to a large extent, by the sharp increase in payments for interest and profits, in 1983 the part played by the increased trade surplus in reducing the imbalance on current account was reinforced by a decline in financial remittances. Such payments, which had more than quadrupled over the previous five years, rising from US$ 8.6 billion in 1977 to almost US$ 36.8 billion in 1982, fell to a little under US$ 34 billion in 1983. This was a result of the limitation on remittances of profits caused by the sharp contraction of domestic economic activity and the slight decline in interest payments brought about by the reduction of nominal interest rates on the international financial market. Under these circumstances, the deficit on current account -which in 1982 had already dropped by 10%, after having reached a record high of US$ 40 billion in 1981-fell spectacularly to under US$ 8.5 billion in 1983. Almost all the countries of the region contributed to this outcome, either by vigorously reducing their current-account deficits; or, as in the case of Mexico and Venezuela, by replacing deficits by large surpluses; or, as happened in Trinidad and Tobago, by increasing their surpluses. The only exceptions to this general trend were Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti and Nicaragua, which showed bigger currentaccount deficits than in the previous year.
Nevertheless, the drastic reduction of the deficit on current account which took place in 1983 was also due, to a very large extent, to a no less radical reduction, for the second year in a row, of net movements of capital. Between 1981 and 1982, capital flows had already fallen from US$ 38 billion to US$ 16.6 billion and in 1983 they dropped to under US$ 4.5 billion.
As in 1982, the net total of investments and external loans was much lower than net payments for interest and profits, which meant that in 1983 Latin America transferred real resources abroad to an amount of almost US$ 29.5 billion, 46% more than the already very substantial sum transferred in 1982.
In 1983, the net inflow of capital was also smaller than the deficit on current account, a situation which had already occurred in both 1981 and 1982. Consequently, the global balance of payments closed with a deficit for the third year in succession. Although the total of slightly under US$ 4 billion was equivalent to one-fifth that of 1982, it was over 70% higher than the negative balance in 1981 (see table 7). Under such circumstances, a substantial part of the increase in the debt was accounted for by the fact that the banks capitalized interest payments. This was partly due to the pressure brought to bear by the International Monetary Fund to induce the banks to refinance part (usually around 50%) of the interest earned, as a contribution to dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and Paraguay, requested a rescheduling of their external debt payments. Cuba and Jamaica did so likewise, but are not shown in the table because the necessary information was not available. For a detailed analysis of the renegotiation of the external debt, see Part I of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982. the adjustment programmes sponsored by the Fund.
The need to refinance a considerable portion of the interest payments becomes obvious when one takes into account the tremendous burden which they represent for most of the countries of the region. Indeed, despite the fact that in 1983 interest payments fell, mainly as a result of the slight decline in the prevailing rates on the main international financial markets, they still amounted to the equivalent of 35% of the value of exports of goods and services for the region as a whole (see table 14 ). Although this is somewhat lower than the 38% which they repre- sented in 1982, it was higher than the proportions recorded between 1977 and 1981 and much higher than the 20% which is usually considered an acceptable ceiling. The percentage of export earnings which had to be devoted to interest payments in 1983 was considerably more than the average in Argentina (51%), Brazil (44%) and Costa Rica (44%). On the other hand, it was much lower than the average in El Salvador (10.5%), Guatemala (7.5%) and Haiti (3.5%).
Ill
External financing and the real transfer of resources
The abrupt adjustment of the balance-ofpayments current account which took place in 1983 was enforced, to a large extent, by the no less violent contraction of the net inflow of capital. Indeed, in 1983, the total inflow of capital was barely one-fourth of that received in 1982 -which had already been very low-and only 15% of the average inflow of capital during the four-year period 1978-1981 (see table 15 ). The negative impact of this sharp drop in the net inflow of capital becomes even more obvious when one compares the amount of capital received with the value represented by net payments of interest and profits, which in 1983 exceeded, for the second year in a row, that of net loans and investments received. Consequently, as in 1982, instead of receiving a net transfer of real resources from abroad, Latin America made a net transfer of resources to the rest of the world. Thus, a situation was provoked which, considering the relative development of the region, may be described as perverse.
The amounts involved in this transfer were very large: US$ 20 billion in 1982 and almost US$ 30 billion in 1983, i.e., magnitudes equivalent to 19% and 27% of the value of exports of goods and services and between 2.5% and 4% of the gross domestic product. Considered from another angle, the reversal in the direction of net financial payments which took place between 1981 and 1983 was equivalent to a deterioration of the terms of trade by almost one-third.
The deflection of net financial flows was a decisive cause of the widespread contraction of economic activity in Latin America and of the difficulties which some countries experienced in servicing their external debt. As may be clearly seert in table 15, up to 1981 the gross amount of capital received by the region was well in excess of its amortization payments, investments abroad and remittances of interest and profits. During the period 1973-1981, this transfer of resources was equivalent, on average, to 16% of the value of exports, which, in turn, increased during that period at an annual rate of around 20%. Under such circumstances, Latin America was able to make amortization and interest payments on its external debt and on profits earned by foreign capital by means of the new loans and investments it received each year.
The magnitude of this net transfer of resources began to lessen in 1979, when the increases in the net inflow of capital were more than offset by the even larger increases in payments on interest and profits. This trend reached a peak in 1982-1983, when the net inflow of capital plummeted and the region had to meet the bulk of its payments for interest and profits from resources originating in the trade surplus or the international reserves it had previously accumulated. Because of the unfavourable external situation, however, the trade surplus was not produced by an increase in exports, but rather by an extremely severe contraction of imports, and this in turn had a negative effect on economic activity. Owing to this chain reaction, the drastic reduction in the net inflow of capital ultimately affected the levels of production and employment.
In turn, the fundamental cause of the decline in net loans and investments which took place over the last two years was the procyclical reaction of the international commercial banks -Latin America's main creditors-vis-à-vis the unfavourable external situation with which the region was faced. This attitude was clearly evidenced for the first time in 1982 and persisted in 1983. Thus, according to figures provided by the Bank for International Settlements, new loans granted by private banks to Latin America (excluding Venezuela and Ecuador) fell from US$ 21 billion during the second half of 1981 to US$ 12 billion during the first half and barely US$ 300 million during the second half of 1982.
During the first six months of 1983, the banks granted loans amounting to US$ 3.7 billion. Nevertheless, this improvement was not the result of a 'spontaneous' response on the part of the banks but rather was accounted for by the fact that the banks were pressured by the International Monetary Fund to contribute to the 'rescue packages' designed by that institution to facilitate the adjustment process in a number of Latin American economies.
IV
Final conclusions
The unique profile of the Latin American economic crisis
The figures given above show the unusual scope and depth of the recessive crisis which almost every Latin American country is experiencing and leave no doubt that, for the region as a whole, 1983 was the worst year in the last half century. For most of the countries, the reduction of income during the period 1982-1983 has meant going back to the standard of living of several years ago.
It is true, of course, that in many cases the crisis was partly the result of domestic factors related to ill-advised economic strategies or policies, the prolonged application of which was facilitated by the accelerated growth of external indebtedness and by the international financial permissiveness that prevailed during the 1970s.
It is no less true, however, that the serious balance-of-payments crisis with which Latin America has been faced in recent years may be attributed, to a large extent, to external causes which by their very nature are beyond the control of the countries of the region. Cases in point are the spectacular drop in the terms of trade, the high nominal and real interest rates and the severe contraction of the net inflow of private capital. Even more unpredictable have been the intensity and the duration of this phenomenon, situation which is clearly atypical by comparison with what has happened in the large central countries during previous recessions.
In any event, it is obvious that at this stage of the game, the solution to some of the most serious problems besetting the region will depend mainly on external factors over which the region has little or no control. That is why the domestic economic policy options open to the countries are so complex and fraught with difficulties, and that is also why the prevailing atmosphere today is one of uncertainty and perplexity.
In order to deal with the balance-ofpayments crisis, many Latin American countries implemented, as from 1982, drastic and painful adjustment measures whereby imports were reduced so dramatically that in many cases the volume of imports fell by over 50% during the last two years. In addition, the sharp devaluations made by many countries in order to balance their external accounts contributed to the reinforcement of inflationary pressures, which led after a time to the application of stabilization policies. Thus, the recessive effect which is normally produced by such policies over the short term was added to that produced by the pronounced decrease in imports. The combination of these factors had another serious consequence: investment slumped, and in some countries a significant proportion of installed capital deteriorated or was destroyed, as many enterprises went out of business.
The social consequences of the current situation have been no less serious. Indeed, in many countries, employment and real wages have fallen to the lowest levels since the Great Depression, and, in some cases, have nearly reached the critical limits of social tolerance.
In some countries the situation has been further aggravated by exceptionally severe natural disasters, which have accentuated the loss of income and the slowdown of the economy caused by the general crisis.
Nevertheless, not everything was negative in 1983. Some countries which had already followed cautious policies with respect to foreign debt were better able to cope with the adverse effects of the international situation. Many others have implemented programmes aimed at adjusting their balance of payments and in this effort have received some co-operation from the international financial community; this has prevented the immediate effects of the crisis from being still. Moreover, a relatively calm atmosphere has been restored on the immediate financial scene; this, of course, does not mean that the problems have been solved or that the risks of acute financial crises have been eliminated.
These and other features of the situation show that the Latin American recession has a profile of its own and that the position in Latin 34 CEPAL REVIEW No. 22 / Apnl 1984 America is different from that in other regions of the Third World and, as matter of fact, from any similar situation that has arisen since the Second World War.
The questions of the moment
Latin America has undoubtedly shown a remarkable sense of responsibility in the way that it has responded to the challenges posed by the current external crisis. Suffice it to recall that in the last few years many of the countries implemented sharp real devaluations with a view to promoting their exports, substituting domestic production for essential imports and eliminating nonessential imports. To reduce domestic overspending and fiscal deficits, they have also substantially raised the prices of many public utilities and reduced a number of subsidies.
Nevertheless, these measures -which, of course, are not easy to implement, politically speaking, and which were oriented towards reallocating resources to the production of tradable goods-were taken on the assumption that a reactivation of the international economy would facilitate exports and bring back the terms of trade and interest rates to levels closer to those which had been normal in the past.
Unfortunately, this was not the case. Although 1983 saw the beginning of a recovery in the leading central economy, this has not benefited Latin America through any of the abovementioned mechanisms. Moreover, over the last few years, and especially in 1983, the region has been affected by yet another unfavourable change on the external scene: the drastic reduction of the inflow of capital, the effect of which has been equivalent to a deterioration of the terms of trade by one-third.
Hence domestic adjustment had to be recessive in nature and was based on an unprecedented reduction of imports -even essential ones-and not on an increase in exports. Thus, precisely at the worst time -during an international recession-the region was obliged to generate a substantial trade surplus, to become a net exporter of resources to the central countries, and to accept additional and exceedingly burdensome costs in order to be able to refinance part of the external debt it had accumulated.
It therefore seems only natural that, as 1983
comes to a close, we should ask ourselves the following questions: What can Latin America expect, over the short term, of the current reactivation of the international economy? How long can the indispensable domestic reactivation be postponed if the present situation of the international economy continues to prevail? After the profound traumas of the last few years, will moderate rates of economic recovery be adequate to deal with the acute social problems that have arisen as a result of the recession of the last three years? i) What international economic recovery? International public opinion views the economic recovery of the United States with satisfaction, but also points to the contradictions and puzzles posed by the phenomena which accompany it. On the one hand, the so-called 'locomotive' theory, according to which the United States economy would be dynamic enough to pull along the other industrial centres, shows no sign of having been confirmed at this juncture. There are, moreover, still three elements that are vital if the international recovery is to have any significant effect on the countries of the periphery and, in particular, on the Latin American economies.
In the field of trade, the terms of trade of Latin America have continued to deteriorate -with some exceptions-during 1983 and no substantial increase in commodity prices seems to be in sight in the near future. Furthermore, as a result of certain well-known phenomena, some of which have to do with the high level of real interest rates, protectionist trends in the central countries have persisted and even increased; this detracts from the transparency and dynamism of international trade and particularly hinders the growth of new exports.
In the financial field, real interest rates continue to be very high, as a result of many factors, to wit: the fact that the governments of some industrial countries have resorted to the financial systems to cover their substantial fiscal deficits; the nature of the anti-inflationary policies applied in the large central economies; the disappearance of the liquid surpluses of the oilexporting countries', the pressure to attract savings in order to cope with new capital-intensive investment; and others. Thus, hardly anyone thinks that in 1984 there will be any considerable reduction of real interest rates, a matter which is of fundamental importance to the management of the external debt of the developing countries.
In the field of capital transfers, there has been a drastic reduction in the net inflow of capital, which, after having reached an unprecedented level of US$ 38 billion in 1981, fell to barely US$ 4.5 billion in 1983; this drop would have been even greater had not the International Monetary Fund prevailed on the commercial banks to increase somewhat their loans to Latin America.
The behaviour of these variables in the reactivation process is fundamental to the viability of the current adjustment processes. It should be reflected that if the terms of trade had been similar in 1983 to what they were in 1980 (25% higher) and if at the same time real interest rates had been similar to those prevailing when the bulk of the debt was contracted (on average, 4 points lower than at present), the region would have had US$ 25 billion more during 1983; with this amount it could easily have met its commitments without having to reduce its imports so drastically and without having ro resort to new external borrowing. In other words, if normal conditions were restored in the areas of trade and finance, Latin America would be able to meet its external commitments without having to sacrifice its potential for growth.
ii) Latin America cannot continue to contract its economy. It must be made quite clear that the region cannot go on applying the current adjustment mechanisms for much longer under the existing external conditions. This could lead, at least in some countries, to situations that would be difficult to control, both economically and socially, and could give rise to tensions which would jeopardize the very capacity of the economies to recover and hence to service their accumulated debt on time. It is relevant, therefore, to ask what the main limitations of the current adjustment processes are.
In recent years, the region has had to carry out what essentially amounts to a twofold adjustment. The first and better-known is the adjustment to the extremely unfavourable trend in the terms of trade and in real interest rates. The second has been the adjustment aimed at dealing with a more recent but no less serious development, i.e., the massive withdrawal of the net inflow of private capital. Thus, because the contraction of international trade and the 'financial depression' have occurred simultaneously, the region has not only had to adjust but has had, in actual fact, to 'overadjust'.
Because the net inflow of capital shrank so enormously and payments for profits and interest were so high, Latin America -for the first time in 1982 and again and to a greater extent in 1983-made net transfers of resources abroad which amounted to USf 20 billion and US$ 29 billion respectively. This situation, which contrasts sharply with what had historically been the case in the developing countries, has become a key element in the profound depression in Latin America and one which will also be a decisive factor in the establishment of any economic recovery policy to be pursued in the future.
There are also other factors which have contributed to the aggravation of the balance-ofpayments problems. Among these, special mention should be made of the high costs and the bank surcharges that are involved in the renegotiation process, which have been added to the negative effects of the high interest rates. This increase in the financial costs -which contrasts with past experience and with the crisis measures normally applied in the case of any enterprisehas aggravated external imbalances and has meant that virtually all the cost of adjustment has been transferred to the debtor countries. Indeed, this procedure is tantamount to an abdication, on the part of the international commercial banks, of their share of the responsibility for triggering the payments crisis with which the region is now faced.
Latin America cannot prolong the current process of recessive adjustment; instead, what it needs is to carry out a growth-oriented adjustment. In so far as it must for some time generate a trade surplus, it will have to achieve this by increasing exports -i.e., by resorting to a factor that helps raise the rate of economic growthrather than by again reducing imports, which would only make the recession worse.
The indispensable reactivation
One of the most puzzling questions of the moment is the prevailing uncertainty about the possible modalities and prospects of international reactivation. However, if the current situation with respect to prices of raw materials, real interest rates and transfers of private capital were to continue, two different courses would probably be followed by the economies of the region in 1984. Some countries whose external situation is better and whose domestic adjustment programmes have been relatively successful could see a modest recovery in their economic growth rate. But because the service of their external debt would represent such a heavy burden, they would have little room left for the recovery of domestic expenditure and hence of employment levels. Other countries which face more difficult external circumstances and, in addition, have to struggle with heavy inflationary pressures, might witness a persistence of recessive trends, and this would aggravate the critical economic and social situation that has prevailed in them in recent years.
In actual fact, neither the first of these options nor much less the second is acceptable. What Latin America needs is a firm and vigorous reactivation policy. Indubitably, however, any recovery process aimed at strengthening the deteriorated regional economy will be conditioned by both external and internal factors. Among the former, the most important and the one which, in the last analysis determines, over the short run, the room for manoeuvre which most of the Latin American governments will have for implementing economic reactivation policies is the rescheduling of the external debt. Over the medium term, on the other hand, the key element for enabling Latin America to achieve rapid and persistent economic growth is the expansion of its external trade, both within the region and with the rest of the world.
Two of the internal factors that shape the effort to put more dynamism into the economy seem to be dominant: firstly, making reactivation programmes compatible with the abatement of inflationary pressures, both traditional and recent; secondly, the restructuring of growth patterns over the medium term required in order to achieve, among other objectives, a substantial increase in the region's export capacity. This second factor is, moreover, the essential requisite for enabling the region to make the service payments on its accumulated debt on time.
It is important to stress, however, that not all the Latin American countries are in the same situation as regards the servicing of the debt under the current adjustment mechanisms; moreover, the unfavourable international situation does not affect all of them in the same way. That is why it would be very difficult to arrange for a joint rescheduling of Latin America's external debt.
Nevertheless, in view of the absolute necessity of conditioning debt servicing to the requirements of domestic recovery and economic development, the time seems to have come, for many countries, to make global proposals for changes in the existing rescheduling mechanisms. To this end, joint action should in our opinion be undertaken, in accordance with the proposals made by the Group of 24, to promote, in international fora such as those afforded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, measures to improve not only the existing international financial mechanism but also the international environment in which the adjustment processes are carried out.
It would be equally to the point for the countries of the region jointly to put before the international financial community certain minimum conditions that must be met in the immediate future in connection with the adjustment processes, until such time as the conditions on the international commercial financial markets improve. These conditions should include, among others, the following: -in no case should a country devote to the servicing of its external debt resources amounting to more than a prudent percentage of its export earnings, such as will enable it to maintain the minimum level of imports compatible with its economic recovery and development; -it should be advocated that the cost of making adjustments be distributed more evenly by drastically reducing the current financial costs that are added to the high interest rates. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of using provisional mechanisms, similar to the interest rate subsidies which were studied during the 1960s, especially for international loans from public sources, and which considerably alleviated the financial burdens, of such vital importance in the current adjustment process; -amortization periods should be extended considerably in order to prevent in future the persistence of a perverse transfer abroad of resources; -firm commitments should be secured with a view to obtaining additional resources which will provide for the financing of a higher proportion of interest payments, facilitate the expansion of trade in the countries of the region, and ensure thé financing of satisfactory levels of domestic investment. In this regard, renewed support for the efforts of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other regional financing agencies will be of fundamental importance.
In recent times, long-term global solutions have been proposed which have not yet been given proper attention by the large financial centres of the world. Nevertheless, if the current international situation were to continue much longer, the force of circumstances might make some of these alternatives viable. In particular, it would be worth while to consider the possibility of converting a substantial part of the accumulated debt into long-term bonds, with real interest rates near to historical levels and with grace periods for their servicing to begin. This would enable the countries to gain time for undertaking the necessary domestic adjustments and for the measures aimed at increasing their export and import-substitution capacity to take effect.
In any event, the management of the debt under existing international circumstances presents the region with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, to eliminate the perverse transfers of resources abroad so as to sustain domestic reactivation programmes, it would be necessary to obtain new net credits which would raise the already high level of the existing external debt; on the other hand, in order to meet part of the debt service with resources generated through a trade surplus, it would be necessary, in default of a significant increase in exports, to reduce yet again the already low volume of imports, and this would militate against any effort to reactivate the economy. That is why, over the short term, any effort that is made in this regard must provide for both an inflow of new resources and a substantial abatement of financial costs.
The current preoccupation with the problems pertaining to the management of the external debt has led the countries to overlook the close linkage that exists between their debt and their trade problems. In the last analysis, the final solution to existing and future balance-ofpayments problems can be found only by expanding trade and increasing export income. To achieve this, it will of course be necessary to increase the countries' export capacity; however, it will likewise be necessary to create an international environment in which the markets for Latin American exports can be expanded and their prices can be improved. The protectionist practices that are being increasingly applied in the central countries certainly do not make it easy for these conditions to be met.
Concomitantly with the contraction of Latin America's trade with the rest of the world, there has been a sharp deterioration of regional trade and a recrudescence, in no few Latin American countries, of defensive measures of a protectionist nature prompted by the difficult balance-ofpayments situation that almost all these countries are facing.
This state of affairs must not continue. In order to reverse it, the first necessary step would be to call a halt to the imposition of new measures that hinder intra-regional trade, and the second, to adopt various measures of a preferential type, such as ad hoc agreements of limited scope or the utilization of State purchasing power. To this end, it will also be essential for the existing regional financial mechanisms to be expanded and for a more imaginative role to be enacted by Latin American financial institutions, some of which are already implementing programmes to support the expansion of intra-regional trade.
These and other joint policies that might be adopted by the region in present circumstances, in order both to promote collectively the adoption of measures at the international level and to accelerate regional co-operation movements and pursue them in greater depth, were analysed at a meeting which, at the invitation of the President of the Republic of Ecuador, was held in Quito in January 1984, and was attended by Heads of State and their personal representatives at the ministerial level. (See the Quito Declaration and Plan of Action in this same issue of the Review.).
In the very near future the region will have to deal with a series of factors that will force it to
